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Megacities without global functions
Les Mégapoles sans fonctions globales
Lise Bourdeau-Lepage and Jean-Marie Huriot
 
Introduction
1 The new urban revolution, which begun in the second half of the 20th century, and has
gathered pace for a quarter of a century, is going to challenge the relation between the
size  and the economic  role  of  cities.  This  revolution is  mainly  characterized by two
divergent phenomena. 
2 On one side, the last decades have witnessed the emergence and the never seen growth of
very large cities. This paper focuses on cities with more than 5 million inhabitants, which
are called “megacities”, given that this term has no universal meaning (this definition of
megacities  is  more  extensive  than  that  adopted  by  the  United  Nations).  In  1950,  8
megacities  in  the  world  represented  58  million  inhabitants.  In  2005,  49  megacities
represent nearly 500 million inhabitants, i.e. 7.6% of the world population. Most of them
are located in less developed countries1 (LDCs). The number of cities of more than 10
million inhabitants has grown from 2 in 1950 to 20 in 2005 (UN, 2004).
3 On the other side, the globalization of the economy generates a new urban organization
where a few number of cities concentrate a disproportionate part of economic power,
essentially through the headquarters of world leading companies, and through finance
and other advanced producer services.  These global  cities,  also called world cities or
world metropolises, have been analyzed by Hall (1966), Friedman (1986), Sassen (1991,
2000), Lacour (1999) and Bourdeau-Lepage and Huriot (2005), and have been identified
and measured in  particular  by  Taylor  (2004)  and the  Globalization and World  Cities
(GaWC) group and network. Most of the criteria used for identifying global cities refer to
the  concentration  of  specialized  services  –  such  as  advanced  producer  services  of
financial  services – and to their global  interactions.  But these activities are only the
expression of what we consider as the very nature of the global city, i.e. its specialization
in the function of coordination. 
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4 More precisely, we consider that the global city is a city in a position to realize the economic
coordination of complex activities at a global scale. Though it represents only a minor part of
these cities’ activities, the coordination function is considered as the major character of
global cities.  It  is through that function that they gain their strategic position in the
global economy, and the concentration of this function makes them different from other
cities. 
5 Coordination is thus the first key concept of this paper. “Coordination is defined as the set
of  interactions between economic agents  brought  into play in the aim of  organizing
production, exchange and consumption efficiently” (Bourdeau-Lepage and Huriot, 2005).
Coordination is carried out by individual agents themselves and increasingly by specific
advanced services. 
6 Now  megacities  and  global  cities  are  partly  diverging.  During  the  last  fifty  years,
numerous  megacities  emerged and a  large  number  of  them did  not  gain  any global
economic dimension or global function.  The divergence is particularly marked in the
poorest countries. Most of the largest cities are located in the less developed countries,
while the global cities are mainly located in the more developed countries. This might be
an additional impediment to development, or even a factor of cumulative gap with the
richest countries,  and an increasing obstacle to the integration of the less developed
countries in the global economy. 
7 The abundance of contributions dealing with megacities and the richness of the literature
on global – or world – cities contrast starkly with the poverty of attempts to investigate
this  “mega-global  divergence”.  This  is  probably  the  consequence  of  a  multiple
segmentation of research. 
8 First,  it  is  common to  separate  the  demographic  nature  of  the  megacities’  dramatic
growth from the specific economic dimension of the rise of global cities. In point of fact,
the problem is less simple because demographic and economic factors are closely linked
in both phenomena. 
9 Second, the literature on global cities pays little attention to the less developed countries,
where  most  megacities  are  located,  while  the  literature  on  megacities  describes  the
disastrous consequences of this over-urbanization in the LDCs in terms of development,
but is not very prolix on the conditions of their economic globalization. Thus there is a
second clear-cut separation, between economics of development and economics of global
cities. This is only a facet of the more general separation between economics of cities,
which  is  mainly  focused  on  city  formation  and  growth  in  developed  countries,  and
development economics, which for the most part ignores the specific urban dimension of
the process of megacity formation.
10 Despite such a confused scientific landscape, one idea is emerging. A general but not
exhaustive  survey  of  the  two  literatures  on  megacities  and  on  global cities,  in  the
“mainstream” economic theory as well as in the so-called “heterodox” economy, suggests
that all the things being equal, the nature and quality of institutions – in the sense of
North (1990) – might be decisive in the process of emergence of a global city. Indeed, in a
number of poor countries, institutions are actually not able to promote the emergence of
global coordination functions. 
11 As a consequence, institutions is the second key concept of this paper. They can be defined
as “the rules of the game in a society, or the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction” (North, 1990). Formal and informal institutions define and limit the
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set of choices of economic agents and determine the form of economic organizations.
They favor or discourage exchanges and all forms of interactions, and especially those
needed by coordination of economic activity. 
12 The paper is founded on the following rationale. The global city is able to coordinate
complex global activities. This ability supposes the capacity to interact, to cooperate in
accordance with coherent, well established and well accepted rules of the game. These
rules are the institutions. They play a large part in the divergence we are interested in. 
13 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First the divergence between the growth of
megacities and the development of global cities is characterized more precisely and the
relation between this mega-global divergence and the level of economic development is
described. Second, some tracks are given for understanding why some megacities in LDCs
hardly  develop  effective  global  economic  functions.  Institutional  factors  including
governance, social connectivity, and more generally all kinds of formal and informal rules
of the economic and social game are brought in the forefront. The main data concerning
the 49 megacities in 2005 are regrouped in the appendix. 
 
The nature of the mega-global divergence
14 Two major transformations affect world’s cities: on the one hand, the rise of mega-cities;
on the other hand, city globalization, i.e. the emergence of cities deciding, operating and
interacting at a global scale. The fact is that the largest megacities are not necessary well
ranked as global cities, if they are ranked however. What are the nature and the extent of
this divergence? Does it simply reflect the more general divergence of development in the
present-day economy or is it a specific phenomenon, which obeys to original processes? 
 
The modalities of megacities’ inflation
15 The prefix  “mega-”  means  one million,  however  the  minimum size  of  a  megacity  is
usually supposed to be comprised between 4 and 10 million, depending of the source
(Daniels, 2004). The United Nations retain the threshold of 10 million. In this paper we
call megacities all the agglomerations of more than 5 million inhabitants. This is in some
way arbitrary but this defines a significant set of very large cities in the world. It must be
kept  in  mind  that  the  composition  of  this set  is  imprecise:  there  is  a  noticeable
discrepancy between the estimations of cities’ populations coming from different sources
2. 
16 On the basis of United Nations data (table 1), there were 8 megacities in 1950 (of which 2
were in LDCs), 26 in 1980 (16 in LDCs), 49 in 2005 (35 in LDCs). In 2015, there will probably
be 59 megacities, and 43 will be located in LDCs. 
17 The LDC-MDC classification of countries is rather rough, but it gives a first idea of the
geographical distribution of megacities.
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Table 1. Mega-cities, 1950-2015.
18 Such figures must be carefully interpreted. The dramatic rise of megacities in the LDCs
must be qualified. It is less dramatic when related to the scale of LDCs’ population. Four
features must be pointed out. 
1. The weight of megacities population remains weaker in LDCs than in MDCs,  relatively to urban
population as well as to total population, and it will still probably remain so in 2015. The
same tendency is observed for cities of more than 10 millions inhabitants (table 1, lines 7, 8,
11, 12).
2. The rise of megacities is both strongly localized (only a small part of the less developed world is
affected) and extremely rapid.  In its period of most rapid growth, London’s population has
been multiplied by 7 in 110 years (1800-1910). In comparison, the population of Mumbai has
been multiplied by 6 and that of Sao Paulo by 8 in only half a century. Between 1975 and
2000, certain megacities exhibit average annual growth rates never seen in urban history,
more often than not over 3% and even over 6% in Dhaka (6.17%) and in Lagos (6.09). This
rate is very much lower in MDC’s. 
3. Megacities are going to emerge and grow in LDCs, but rarely in the poorest countries. 
In 2005, only 2 megacities are located in the Least DCs. It could mean that a minimum level
of development is required for the emergence of a megacity. 
4. Megacities growth is of a specific nature in LDCs. 
The explosion of megacities in LDCs results from both the population growth (due to the
demographic transition) – and the process of migration (due to economic factors: the gap
between  urban  and  rural  productivities  and  incomes,  and  to  sociological  reasons:  the
attraction of the urban way of life). On the contrary, most megacities in MDCs have long
been large  cities,  the  growth of  which  has  been much more  slow and regular,  in  close
relation with their economic activity (Henry, 2005).
 
City size and the logic of city globalization 
19 From economics of  cities (Huriot and Thisse,  2000;  Fujita and Thisse,  2002) it  can be
expected that city size favors city globalization,  all  the things being equal.  This can be
explained by increasing returns, diversity and externalities.
20 The coordination function of global cities rests on advanced specialized services, which
are  subject  to  increasing  returns.  They  are  using  high-skilled  workers  and  high
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interaction abilities. The implementation of these skills and abilities is more efficient at a
large  scale.  It  is  one  of  the  well-known reasons  for  the  externalization of  advanced
services  and  for  their  concentration  in  very  large  cities.  Other  reasons  of  this
concentration could be added, such as the heavy real estate investments of these firms,
and the search for urban amenities and for high levels of culture and education by their
skilled workers. 
21 These services are intensive users of information. Their global coordination functions put
them  in  connection  with  the  world.  The  new  information  technologies  make  such
interactions quasi-instantaneous and potentially unlimited. However, telecommunication
infrastructures, them as well, are subject to increasing returns because of important fixed
costs, and thus they are not present everywhere, but only in very large cities (Bourdeau-
Lepage and Huriot, 2005). 
22 City size usually goes along with urban diversity, which is a source of interactions and of
externalities,  related  notably to  proximity  and  to  information  exchanges.  Size  and
diversity are also factors of a good match between supply and demand of skills on the
labor market. 
23 The  relation  between  city  size  and  the  correlative  presence  of  diversity  and  of
externalities on the one hand, and city globalization on the other hand, is circular and
cumulative, so that city globalization causes city globalization and the process is more or
less locked-in. 
24 The  next  subsection  states  that  the  empirical  relation  between  city  size  and  city
globalization does not fit so well the preceding theoretical statement. 
 
Characterizing the divergence 
Size and global functions 
25 The global performances of a city are not closely linked to its size.  The GaWC group
proposes  different  evaluations  of  such  performances.  One  of  them  is  based  on  the
presence of global firms in four categories of advances services (Beaverstock et al. 1999).
It leads to the selection of 123 cities, the scores of which vary from 12 (the top level of the
“alpha world cities”) to 1 (the lowest level, “minimal evidence of world city formation”).
This grading will be referred to under the name “global advanced services” (GAS). 
26 There is no clear evidence of a strong positive relation between these global scores and
the sizes of the 123 cities. 
27 First, a significant part of the best-ranked cities in the GAS grading are not megacities.
Some of them, especially in Europe, have around 1 million (Zurich, with a score of 9,
Brussels, 8, Amsterdam and Geneva, 6). 
28 Second, a large part of the megacities has low global scores. Among the 49 megacities
registered in 2005, only 15 have scores of 6 and more and 34 have scores less than 6.
Among the latter, 15 have a null score: they have no evidence of any global function and
are not included in the GAS grading. Even the largest megacities (of more than 10 million)
are not necessarily global cities. Only 8 of the 20 largest megacities have global scores of 6
and more, and 4 (Calcutta, Dhaka, Karachi and Lagos) remain out of the GAS grading. 
29 It results that size seems to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for obtaining the
status of global city. 
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30 A more precise GAWC classification confirms this statement. It is based on the level of
global interactions between cities (Taylor et al., 2002). Interactions in a set of 100 global
firms in 6 advanced services localized in 315 cities are indirectly estimated for 2000. The
resulting  “global  network  connectivity”  (GNC)  that  characterizes  each  of  the  49
megacities is expressed in percentage of the score of the best connected city, London.
There is only a weak correlation between megacity size in 2000 and GNC (figure 1). The
determination coefficient is significant but low (0.165).
 
Figure 1. Global network connectivity and size of megacities in 2000.
31 Without the extreme case of Tokyo, the determination coefficient is even smaller (0.144).
This is not a surprising feature. Even if it is a favorable factor, the quantity of people
cannot as such generate the ability to coordinate complex economic activities at a global
scale. The global functions of megacities may certainly be better correlated with the level
of economic development. 
 
Global functions and economic development 
32 Global  functions  of  megacities  are  reasonably  expected to  depend of  their  economic
performances. Given the scarcity of data on development at the urban level, we can use
the results of the important work by Moriconoi-Ebrard (2000) despite the fact they were
obtained for 1995. Moriconi-Ebrard calculated the gross urban product for all the cities of
more than 2 million inhabitants. Figure 2 relates the GNC to the logarithm of the GUP
(gross  urban  product)  per  capita.  The  use  of  the  logarithm reflects  the  well-known
decreasing marginal effect of an increasing product per capita. The regression is good,
with r2 equal to 0.511 and a good significance. 
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Figure 2. Global network connectivity of megacities and log GUP per capita.
33 As expected, if the logarithm of the GUP per capita is replaced by the logarithm of the
GDP per capita of the corresponding country, the regression is less good, with r2 equal to
0.423. The global network connectivity level of a city is more closely linked with the level
of economic development of the city than with the level of development of the country. 
34 Surprisingly enough, the determination coefficient is even smaller (0.414) when the GNC
is  related  to  the  human  development  index  (HDI,  see  appendix),  though  this  index
includes the level of education and the life expectancy besides the logarithm of the GDP
per capita.  These human components give an evaluation of the skill  level and of the
quality of life and one could have expected that they have an effect on city globalization.
This primacy of economic factors is not surprising, as far as the criteria of globalization
are themselves strictly economic. But it does not exclude the role of other factors, like
institutions, which condition economic performances. 
35 Examination of the scatterplot gives additional information. Most points occupy only the
left lower and the right higher parts of the graph, limited by the doted lines. No megacity
with a GUP per capita inferior to 10,000 $ can reach a global network connectivity of at
least 60 (London= 100).  It  means that no megacity exhibits high global  performances
together with a low degree of development; in other words, all the megacities with a low
development level have weak global performances. Conversely, only a small number of
megacities  are  immersed  in  a  high developed environment  without  being  important
global cities. The extreme case of Osaka-Kobe (at the right bottom of the graph) may be
explained by the “shadow effect” due to the proximity of one of the leading global cities,
Tokyo. 
36 Such an effect may be more general. If only one city per country is retained (that with the
highest global network connectivity), the regression gives even best results, with r2 equal
to 0.856 (0.511 with all megacities), and with a good significance. This means that the
relation between the global performance and the level of economic development is closer
for the subset of the leading global megacities of each country than for the set of all the
megacities. This is a form of shadow effect: secondary global cities may have lower global
performances even if they have very good economic performances. 
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37 Finally,  there  is  a  close  relation  between the  economic  development  and  the  global
performances of a megacity. This diagnosis is reinforced by examining performances in a
more  specific  field  that  is  particularly  crucial  for  city  globalization:  transport  and
communication. 
38 Two series of data converge to show that world’s air traffic is highly concentrated in the
more  developed  regions  of  the  world,  between  these  regions  and  between  their
megacities. 
39 1/Air flows internal to Europe and to Northern America account for nearly the half of the
total world traffic, while 1.3% of this total is internal to Sub-Saharan Africa and less than
1% to South Asia. 8% of the world traffic connects Europe and North America while 0.6%
connects  North America  and South Asia  and 0.3% connects  North America  and Sub-
Saharan Africa (Witlox et al., 2004).
40 2/At the level of the megacities themselves, in percentage of the London traffic (the most
important  of  the  world),  Calcutta  traffic  represents  3% and  Lagos  2.9%.  Half  of  the
megacities have each less than one tenth of the London traffic (from Airport Council
International, preliminary report for 2005).
41 The same tendency can be noted concerning the new communication technologies. For
example, the United States have 63 internet users per 100 inhabitants, India 3.24, Nigeria
1.4, Pakistan 1.3, Bangladesh 0.2 and the Democratic Republic of Congo 0.1 (International
Communication Union, data for 2004).
 
From development to institutions
42 The data presented above do not exactly correspond to what could be expected from the
theoretical role of city size, and the level of economic development seems to play an
important role in the emergence of global functions in a large city. No global city can
emerge without  a  minimum level  of  development.  But  the  direction of  the  eventual
causality  is  hardly  identifiable.  Wondering  whether  underdevelopment  blocks  city
globalization or if the explosive growth of megacities hampers development is not clearly
relevant.  The  two  processes  are  not  exclusive,  on  the  contrary,  they  are  mutually
reinforcing in a cumulative process, like in the case of the more general linkage between
development and urbanization3.
43 Actually, the theoretical relation between city size and city globalization rests on implicit
assumptions. Indeed, city size is a factor of city globalization only if it is able to create
sufficient diversity, skills and information externalities to permit the emergence of global
coordination functions. That means city globalization is subject to the existence of coordination
capacities, and of the ability to implement – and to take advantage of – increasing returns and
information externalities. This depends largely on institutions. If the level of development is
a significant factor of city globalization, it is probably mostly because of the nature and
the quality of institutions. It will be illustrated in the next section. 
 
Institutions matter
44 Although they are really present in less formal analyses, institutions have still made only
a discreet entry in economics of cities. Theory and the analysis of the preceding sections
suggest that institutions matter, because global performances depend on coordination,
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which depends notably on the form of governance and the level of social connectivity. It
is illustrated by the role of corruption and of the informal sector. 
 
Institutions and economics of cities
45 The  disproportionate  growth  of  megacities  and  the  formation  of  global  cities  have
generated a vast literature. But the possible divergence between the two phenomena has
been largely neglected, even by economics of cities, although it deals with each of them.
The mega-global divergence is not really tackled. Most of that part of economics of cities,
which treats the emergence of megacities, is limited to three main questions.
1. Under what conditions can a city reach the size of a megacity? 
Concentration  of  people  and  activities  in  a  city  always  results  from  a  tension  between
centripetal forces – agglomeration economies – and centrifugal forces – agglomeration costs
or  diseconomies.  When  city  grows,  the  resulting  net  benefit  (or  the  utility)  of  a
representative  agent  is  represented  by  an  inverted  “U”  like  curve  ROM  on  figure  3
(Henderson, 1974; Fujita et al, 1999).
This suggests the existence of an optimal size So. But the probability of realization of that
size  depends  on  the  mode  of  coordination  of  agents.  In  a  self-organizing  city,  where
individual agents maximize their private benefit in a non-cooperative game, the city size
can increase up to the maximum SM. If there is too few cities, and thus too large cities, the
typical  city  is  larger  than So.  In  such a city,  no individual  agent will  decide to move to
another place, given that other individuals do not move, because this city yields a higher
benefit than OR, which can be obtained in any isolated (or rural) place. On the contrary, this
city can still attract new migrants from rural space or from small cities, until it reaches the
maximum size SM. 
However,  cooperation  between  agents,  or  centralized  coordination  by  a  “large  agent”
(developer or local government) can incite a number of people to move simultaneously to a
new city where agglomeration benefit is at least that of the initial one. The condition is that
those who coordinate this move can profit from the new situation, by getting back the new
agglomeration benefits. These ideas have been developed for example by Henderson and
Mitra (1996), Becker and Henderson (2000) and Venables (2003).
2. Under what conditions can a system of cities be unbalanced, i.e. have a strong primacy? 
A  number  of  contributions  (for  example  Ades  and  Glaeser,  1995;  Krugman  and  Livas
Elizondo, 1996; Puga, 1998; Duranton, 2000) stress the importance of a variety of factors of
primacy,  most  of  which are  present  in  developing  countries.  Among them,  institutional
elements (mainly governance) are not inconsiderable. However, primacy is weakly linked
with the megacity phenomenon. First, certain countries contain several megacities (Japan,
the United States,  India,  China),  so  that  the primacy index cannot  be defined for  every
megacity. Second, the degree of primacy of the countries concerned is extremely variable:
the share of the primate megacity’s population in the total urban population of its country
varies between 2.4% (Shangai in China) to 42.1% (Tokyo in Japan); and third, this gives no
insight at all into the mega-global divergence.
3. Under what condition does a megacity emerge without any economic growth? 
Duranton (2000) shows that a high primacy configuration (and even a unique megacity) can
emerge with no growth if the city system is centrally planned by a monopolist agent and/or
if  the  fertility  rate  is  high  (i.e. if  the  rate  of  population  growth  is  high).  The  role  of
institutions is decisive, through the more or less central management of the city system.
This contribution half-opens the door of the mega-global divergence.
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Figure 3. City size: optimum vs maximum.
46 Finally, although most authors leave the mega-global divergence out, they all need calling
for some institutional elements to explain urban growth and/or the phenomenon of megacities,
with or without growth. Ades and Glaeser (1995) corroborate empirically the role of these
elements in the emergence of “urban giants” in 85 countries. 
47 From these analyses, and from the results concerning the relations between city size, city
globalization and development, we can draw the following hypothesis. As far as the global
city’s main function is coordination, city globalization depends on the institutional organization of
the economy, on urban institutions and on constraints affecting individual interactions. 
 
Institutions, governance, social connectivity and coordination
48 The ability to global coordination is a necessary condition for a city to gain the status of
global city. This ability is measured by the presence of advanced services and by their
global  influence.  The cumulative logic of  the corresponding agglomeration process is
known. However this logic remains virtual if the rules of the game of the society do not
permit their effective running. 
49 In the framework of  the new institutional  economics,  these rules are represented by
institutions. In this meaning, institutions include all forms of governance, as defined by
United Nations Center for Human Settlement (2001): “Governance is much more than
government. At the city level, it can be defined as the sum of the ways through which
individuals and institutions (public and private) plan and manage their common affairs.”
50 In the digital era, institutions also include what Sassen (2000) calls the social connectivity,
which represents the set of individual and social capacities to use efficiently information
technologies for coordinating and controlling the economy. “To maximize the benefits of
the new information technologies, you need not only the infrastructure but a complex
mix of other resources. Most of the value-added which these technologies can produce for
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advanced service firms lies in the externalities. And this means the material and human
resources  –  state-of-the-art  office  buildings,  top  talent,  and  the social  networking
infrastructure that maximize connectivity. Any town can have the fiber optic cables. But
do they have the rest?” 
51 This is the core of the question. But it is necessary to go further in recognizing that all the
cities cannot have technical infrastructures, for lack of money and of human resources.
This is a matter of fact. In 2003, the United States had 76 personal computers per 100
inhabitants., Pakistan, Nigeria and Irak had less than one (International Communication
Union). Among the cities, which could have technical infrastructures, some do not have
the social connectivity required for their implementation. Without social connectivity,
there is no global coordination. Institutions are a decisive factor.
52 Institutions  can  be  formal  or  informal.  Their  role  is  illustrated  in  three  points:  the
efficiency of formal institutions, the conflict between formal and informal institutions,
and the complementarity between formal and informal institutions.
 
The efficiency of formal institutions
53 Formal rules of the game include political,  legal rules and economic rules relative to
property  rights  and  contracts.  They  aim  at  facilitating  exchanges  and  cooperation,
whatever  their  nature,  provided  that  their  consequences  are  judged  positive  by  the
society (North, 1990). One important aspect of this aim is the enforcement of contracts.
Institutions must generate the trust required for the carrying out of exchanges. Yet, “the
inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment of
the Third World” (North, 1990).
54 The concept of “good institutions” (or even of “good governance”) can be left out because
it is not clearly defined, because it depends strongly on the objective and the point of
view of  those who define it,  and therefore because it  is  more often than not  full  of
ideology. Among the governance, which permits the participation to the globalization
movement, and the governance which is efficient to promote sustainable development
with or without globalization, what is the best? The aim of this paper is not to judge
institutions or governance, but to evaluate their capacity to promote city globalization.
Consequently, institutions are positively evaluated when they make global coordination
of complex operations possible, i.e. when they favor complex and global interactions and
exchanges. 
55 Even if it does not treat megacities stricto sensu, the study of Keivani et al. (2003) is a good
illustration  of  these  relations  between  coordination,  interactions  and  institutions.  It
shows the effect of institutions on the globalization process of certain LDC’s cities, namely
cities of the United Arab Emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, in comparison with
Singapore. Institutions are grasped through the modes of coordination and the nature
and characteristics of public institutions. A survey was conducted on the perception of
the quality of institutions in the two sets of cities.  Remark that formal and informal
institutions are hardly strictly separable in such a survey. Indeed, the judgment on formal
institutions may be influenced by the informal practices. 
56 The results confirm the central role of institutions in economic development and in the
global functions of a city.  In Singapore,  institutions and their coordination capacities
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appear  much  more  adapted  to  the  global  economy.  In  the  United  Arab  Emirates,
governance  is  more  centralized and even monopolized;  interactions  and cooperation
between  departments  and  institutions  are  rather  weak,  and  inside  and  outside
communication is judged insufficient. Moreover, the business environment is more stable
in Singapore. This could be correlated with the fact that the Emirates have no real global
city,  despite their privileged location in the Middle East.  Indeed, GAS grading (scores
varying from 1 to 12) gives the score 2 to Abu Dhabi and Dubai (“some evidence of world
city formation”) while Singapore obtains 10 and is included in the top 10 global cities in
the world (“alpha world cities”). GNC grading (global network connectivity, see section 2)
is equal to 36.3 in Dubai, 20.9 in Abu Dhabi and 64.5 in Singapore.
 
Formal and informal institutions in conflict: the case of corruption
57 “In our daily interactions with others, whether with family, in external social relations,
or in business activities, the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of
conduct,  norms of  behavior  and conventions” (North,  1990).  An informal  convention
becomes a social constraint when almost everybody follows it and if it is in the interest of
each individual that all other individuals follow it provided that the individual does too
(North 1990). 
58 Informal rules are particularly important in LDCs and in medium or low HDI countries,
but they are far from being absent in MDCs. In LDCs, formal rules usually cohabit with
informal rules. Despite the importance of formal rules, informal rules are often stronger
and more durable and they frequently have the final word. In the economy, the two sets
of rules, formal and informal, are in conflict or in cooperation in production activities, in
the modes of exchange, in land tenure rules or in housing conditions. The formal rules of
the  market  can  be  in  conflict  with  traditional  conventions  (individual  haggling
procedures) or with corruption. 
59 Corruption  rests  on  rules  that  differ  radically  from  those  governing  globalization.
Corruption is defined as “a crime perpetrated by officials who misuse public office for
private gain, and, at an aggregate scale, denies citizens their right to self-determination”
(United Nations Center for Human Settlement, 2001). Corruption is more probable where
an official has a monopoly power, a discretionary authority and lack of accountability. It
is less probable where the “ethical ambiance” (that is “the social norms relating to the
public interest”) is high. It discourages entrepreneurship, disfavors foreign investments
and international interactions, and makes global coordination more difficult (Bourdeau-
Lepage and Kolarova, 2005). 
60 Corruption is widespread in developing countries (Transparency International, 2005). It is
negatively  correlated  with  the  degree  of  urbanization  of  countries.  (United  Nations
Center for Human Settlement, 2001, from a sample of 85 countries). It could be because
“urbanized  societies  require  more  accountability  and  more  transparency  of  public
officials” (UNCHS, 2001). 
61 Figure 4 relates the scores of all megacities in terms of global network connectivity to the
2004 index of perceived corruption proposed by Transparency Inter national (2005). This
index  is  a  decreasing  function  of  the  level  of  corruption:  a  low  index  means  high
corruption; it is evaluated at the national level. The analysis gives two results. 
62 First, the regression is good, with a determination coefficient of 0.451 and significant.
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Figure 4. Global network connectivity and corruption.
63 Second,  there  is  a  clustering of  points  in  the scatterplot.  Most  cities  are  distributed
between 2 clusters: in cluster [1], GNC and corruption index are smaller than sixty; for all
cities but one (Seoul) the corruption index is even smaller than 40; in cluster [2], GNC and
corruption index are greater than sixty.  Only four cities remain outside the clusters:
Miami, Santiago, Philadelphia and Osaka-Kobe: they have good corruption indices and
weak global performances. For three of them (Miami, Philadelphia and Osaka-Kobe), it
may come from their position in the shadow of one of the major global cities in the world.
No megacity has both a high corruption level and high global performances. Thus it seems
that, in the set of megacities, high corruption is rather associated with bad global performances
and low corruption with good global performances. Moreover, in cluster [1] (bad corruption
index and low global performances), all the cities but one (Seoul) have a gross urban
product per capita less than 10,000 $, while all the cities but one (Santiago) with a good
corruption index have a gross urban product per capita higher than 10,000 $.
64 To sum up, there is a close correspondence between three variables: the corruption index,
the global network connectivity and the gross urban product. 
65 Corruption is an informal rule of the game and as such it is stronger and more durable
than formal ones.  Consequently,  corruption can hardly be eliminated through formal
ways only.  Anti-corruption barriers  could be inefficient  if  mentalities  do not  change
(Bourdeau-Lepage and Kolarova, 2005). 
66 The cohabitation of formal and informal rules is also observed in the case of formal and
informal sectors. In this case, the two sets of rules are more complements than in conflict.
 
Formal and informal institutions in cooperation: the informal sector
67 Informal  sector,  informal  employment,  informal  economy,  are  extremely  difficult  to
define,  and  even  much  more  difficult  to  measure,  actually  because  they  refer  to
something informal4. Informal sector can be tolerated or even encouraged. It includes a
great  variety  of  legal  activities  –  from itinerant  street  vendors  to  industrial  micro-
enterprises and computing and telecommunication services – and of illegal activities such
as drug dealing, smuggling, gambling or prostitution. 
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68 Informal sector has ever existed, even in the most developed countries. But nowadays it
takes a dramatic extent in the LDCs. Despite statistical difficulties, United Nations Habitat
provides some data (which are only approximate) for a sample of world’s cities, among
which 11 megacities, essentially in LDCs. Employment in the informal sector represents a
large part of these cities’ total employment, with peaks of more than 60% in Delhi and
Dhaka (table 2). 
69 The role of the informal sector in the mega-global divergence is hard to identify and
probably  multiple.  What  follows  only  suggests  some  reflection  avenues  to  be  more
thoroughly investigated. 
 
Table 2. The share of the informal sector in city employment.
Source: UN-Habitat, urban indicators for 1998 (www.unchs.org/programmes/guo/guo_indicators.asp)
70 The informal sector may be both a product and a reinforcing factor of megacity growth
without economic growth, observed in a number of LDCs. But first of all it involves a
particular form of self-organization that permits the survival of a population the size of
which is disproportionate to the economic resources of the megacity. In other words, it
makes possible the survival of a mass of new immigrants thanks to the implementation of
original institutions. The informal sector is by nature the domain of informal rules, which
regulate  also  slums,  shantytowns,  favelas  and other informal  human settlements.  All
these informal elements can be regrouped in the terms “informal society”.
71 The informal society is usually considered as composed of marginal individuals, of people
excluded from the “normal” society. In fact, things are less simple. In the informal society
of a number of LDCs (especially but not only in Africa), exclusion is not only destructive
but also creative (Baron, 1995; Huriot, 1997). One can be excluded only from a particular
and well-defined set of rules. But the victims of exclusion can create their own norms,
their own rules of the game, their own institutions. Informal employment is not anarchy.
It  is  organized  on  the  basis  of  coherent  and  accepted  institutions.  Moreover,  it  is
generally connected to the formal sector, directly of indirectly: formal employees may
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have a  second informal  job,  the  informal  production is  sold  to  formal  workers,  and
informal workers spend their income on formal markets (Daniels, 2004). 
72 The organization of the urban informal sector as a survival sector leads to the following
hypotheses. 
1. Certain  megacities  of  the  LDCs  are  subject  simultaneously  to  two different  institutional
systems, two forms of coordination built on different cultural foundations. These systems
interact in cooperation or in conflict. Institutional incoherence and conflict can reinforce
the lack of coordination and exacerbate urban growth without economic growth, thus more
or less directly aggravate the mega-global divergence. 
2. Informal society is organized
- in order to enable the rural migrant to survive with an income level and a standard of
living higher than the rural ones, even if they are lower than in the urban formal sector 
(note that some informal incomes may be relatively high, especially in illegal activities);
- so as to maintain and encourage a massive immigration from hinterland, i.e. to support a
huge urban growth, incommensurable with the formal economic potential of the megacity. 
73 The latter proposition on megacity growth could be illustrated intuitively by figure 5,
built  on the basis  of  figure 3.  It  can be assumed that  the existence of  an important
informal survival sector maintains a positive net benefit of agglomeration for larger sizes.
The decrease of these benefits is less rapid with an increasing city size and the new net
benefit curve is ROM’. In absence of any large agent and any efficient cooperation, the
city  can continue to  grow up to  the  size  SM’ which might  be  much higher  than the
maximum size  SM without  informal  sector.  This  is  a  very  simplified illustration of  a
possible effect, by no means a demonstration. 
 
Figure 5. Potential city size with informal sector.
74 Informal  society  could  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  the  simultaneity  of  two
phenomena:  the overwhelming growth of  certain megacities and the lack of  efficient
urban coordination, and therefore the lack of global coordination. One of the reasons is
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that the informal sector permits the survival of a large number of immigrants so that it
maintains immigration and urban growth despite poverty and underdevelopment. 
75 In return, the informal sector may be a source of stagnation. It develops essentially in low
technology industry, small retailing, low order services,  and execution activities.  It  is
rarely  creative  and  innovative.  In  addition,  the  administrative  sector  has  generally
overdeveloped  in  most  LDCs  since  decolonization,  and  low  order  services  are
overrepresented  in  the  private  formal  tertiary  sector  (“pseudo  tertiary  sector”  –




76 Bairoch (1988) emphasizes the “urban inflation” of the “Third World”. Sassen (1991, 2000)
stresses  the  emergence  and  growing  domination  of  global  cities.  Contrary  to  urban
growth in the 19th century in Europe, in many cases the urban inflation in poor countries
is cut off from economic growth or development. Contrary to the megacities in the LDCs,
most megacities in MDCs are well rated global cities. This divergence has an important
economic issue in the context of present evolution of the world’s economy. To be a global
city is a condition for the access to economic power. It makes possible the participation to
strategic  economic  decisions,  and  permits  a  better  economic  integration  (Bourdeau-
Lepage, 2005). However, city globalization may well be a factor of growth of a new kind of
inequalities,  not only between cities,  but between nations,  and can contribute to the
formation of a “new geography of centrality and marginality” (Sassen, 2000). 
77 The core of this paper is the relation between coordination and institutions. In order to
be able to coordinate complex and global activities, the cities candidates to globalization
must have technical resources and infrastructures, high skills and above all formal and
informal  institutions well  adapted to  this  objective.  As  a  consequence,  the nature of
institutions is crucial for the understanding of the mega-global divergence. 
78 Finally,  the  mega-global  divergence  is  directly  or  indirectly  related  to  the  level  of
development  of  the  countries  where  megacites  are  located,  which  seems  to  confirm
Polèse’s position that cities are the products of national economic growth (Polèse, 2005),
but it is more closely related to the economic performances of the megacities themselves.
Moreover, this paper suggests that megacities in LDCs, even if they depend on national
characteristics,  can  in  return  be  significant  obstacles  to  development,  because  they
generate or favor the emergence of specific informal organizations and institutions. The
informal sector may generate the conditions of durability of a dramatic urban growth
without economic growth. 
79 The avenues suggested in this paper might be conducted further and more deeply. It
appears that megacities in LDCs and in MDCs obey to different processes and are probably
of different natures. A number of studies show that global cities differ from one region to
the other in the world, in terms of functional specialization (Taylor, 2003). It could be
added that LDCs megacities, follow two very different scenarios.
80 The first scenario maintains these cities in a cumulative process of under-equipment and
under-development. It has been largely evoked above. It concerns mainly the megacities
of Africa and of the poorest countries. 
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81 In the second scenario, certain megacities of South Asia,  Pacific Countries,  China and
Latin  America  are  entering  in  global  business.  Of  the  20  present  largest  megacities,
Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Mumbai, Jakarta and Cairo (by decreasing population order) show
some signs of globalization (Gugler, 2004). Important financial places, business centers
and rich enclaves appear in a number of “poor” megacities. Even in Africa, some cities are
going to gain an international dimension (Van der Merwe, 2003). 
82 These are only signs. It does not necessarily mean that the obstacles underlined above are
got  over,  and  that  from  now  on  institutions  are  well  suited  to global  coordination
functions.  Conversely it  cannot be excluded that  the present  mega-global  divergence
would be only a transition phase, and that a number of LDCs’megacities would follow a
catching  up  process.  Such  transformation  would  change  radically  the  geography  of
centrality and marginality evoked by Sassen (2000).
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
The Human Development Report 2005 (United Nations Development Program, 2005)
defines the HDI as “a summary measure of human development. It measures the
average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human
development:
- A long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth.
- Knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate (with two-thirds weight) and the
combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (with one-third
weight).
- A decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita (PPP US$).” (341)
For technical details, see United Nations Development Program (2005), page 341.
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NOTES
1. This results from the United Nations’ distinction between “more developed countries”
(MDCs : Northern America, Japan, Europe and Autralia/New Zealand), and “less developed
countries” (LDCs : the rest of the world, i.e. Africa, Asia (Excluding Japan), Latin America
and the Caribbean, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia). Among LDCs, 49 countries are
considered as “least developed countries” (Least DCs), of which 34 are in Africa, 9 in Asia,
1 in Latin America and the Caribbean and 5 in Oceania (United Nations, 2004).
2. Even if most sources refer to the concept of agglomeration rather to that of cities,
estimation can differ markedly. An extreme case is Seoul, the estimated population of
which varies in 2000 from 9.6 million (United Nations, 2004) to 20.7 million (Moriconi-
Ebrard, 2000; quoted by Henry, 2005). Consequently, the number of megacities is only a
rough estimate. 
3. However, the problem is quite different, because we are interested only in megacities,
and such cities may appear in countries with relatively low urbanization rates (ratios of
urban population to total population).
4. Definitions of the informal sector are multiple and differ from one country to the other
(Daniels, 2004). Moreover, informal employment must be distinguished from employment
in informal  sector,  as  far  as  there is  informal  employment in the formal  sector  too.
Anyway, this sector does not respect at least one of the MDCs’ dominant rules concerning
enterprise, labor market, salaries and workers’ rights. It is generally non-registered and
continually changing, and thus hardly measurable.
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ABSTRACTS
Present urban evolution is characterized by two major phenomena. On the one hand, the number
of  very  large  cities,  the  megacities,  increases  dramatically,  especially  in  the  less  developed
countries (LDCs). On the other hand, globalization leads to the emergence of cities coordinating
complex  and  global  economic  activities,  the  global  cities,  especially  in  the  more  developed
countries (MDCs). So, the two phenomena are diverging. A number of megacities do not exhibit
any global function.
The  global  performances  of  megacities  are  well  correlated  with  their  degree  of  economic
development.  But it  is  worth wondering why economic underdevelopment is  consistent with
urban growth but not with city globalization.
The paper develops the following arguments. The global city is able to coordinate complex and
global activities. This ability supposes the capacity to interact, to cooperate in accordance with
coherent, well established and well accepted rules of the game, i.e. with institutions. These rules
play a large part in the mega-global divergence. The bad quality of governance, the low level of
social connectivity, the high level of corruption, are important obstacles to city globalization in
LDCs. The existence of an important informal sector may explain that cities in LDCs grow beyond
the size compatible with their economic resources and with their ability to generate externalities
favourable to city globalization.
L’évolution urbaine contemporaine est marquée par deux phénomènes. D’une part, le nombre
des très grandes villes, les mégapoles, augmente rapidement, tout particulièrement dans les pays
moins  développés.  D’autre  part,  la  globalisation  fait  émerger  des  villes  qui  coordonnent  les
activités économiques complexes et globales, les villes globales, tout particulièrement dans les
pays plus développés. Ainsi, les deux phénomènes divergent. Un grand nombre de mégapoles
n’ont aucune fonction globale.
Les performances globales des mégapoles sont bien corrélées à leur niveau de développement
économique.  Mais  on  peut  se  demander  pourquoi  un  faible  niveau  de  développement  est
compatible avec la croissance urbaine et pas avec la globalisation urbaine.
Le papier développe l’argumentation suivante. La ville globale est en mesure de coordonner les
activités complexes et globales. Cette capacité suppose la possibilité d’interagir, de coopérer en
accord avec des règles du jeu bien établies et acceptées,  c’est-à-dire les institutions.  Celles-ci
jouent un rôle important dans la divergence méga-global. La mauvaise qualité de la gouvernance,
le  faible  niveau  de  connectivité  sociale,  la  forte  corruption  sont  d’importants  obstacles  à  la
globalisation  urbaine  dans  les  pays  moins  développés.  L’existence  d’un  important  secteur
informel pourrait expliquer que les villes concernées s’accroissent au-delà de la taille compatible
avec leurs ressources économiques et de leur capacité à engendrer des externalités favorables à
la globalisation urbaine. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: économie urbaine, mégapoles, villes globales, institutions
Keywords: urban economics, megacities, global cities, institutions
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